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Performance or Representation? 
One way for an outsider to appropriate or deterritorialize the 
expression of an adoptive or dominant language is to infiltrate it 
with a foreign symbolism, as did, for example, some literary 
members of the Prague School. Franz Kafka chose another way, 
“the way of dryness and sobriety,” which he imposed on the already 
impoverished German language of Prague (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1975, 34-35).1 Kafka’s choice, like that of James Joyce in English 
and Samuel Beckett in French and English, succeeds, according to 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in reterritorializing these 
languages by “oppos[ing] a purely intensive usage of language to 
any symbolic or even significant or merely signifying usage” 
(oppos[ant] un usage purement intensif de la langue à tout usage 
symbolique, ou même significatif, ou simplement signifiant) 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 35). The potential relevance of this 
Deleuzean perspective on the “minor literatures” of early and mid-
twentieth-century Europe was later reviewed and extended by 
scholars to postcolonial literatures, notably from the Arab world 
and the Caribbean (see, for example, Hallward, 2001; Burns and 
Kaiser, 2012).  
For the literary translator, the question arises as to how she 
might approach the delicate task of migrating texts that resort 
                                                    
1 In order to substantiate specific readings of source texts, this and all 
further translations of Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari (including any 
texts quoted by them), Mohammed Dib, and Martin Richet are my 
translations from the French editions, unless otherwise stated. I am 
grateful for the guidance of earlier translations, where available, and 
these are listed in the Reference List. 
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largely to “a purely intensive usage of language,” while 
acknowledging that such texts share a mode of expression that 
transcends historical or critical periodization (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1975, 35). From the moment translation became a self-
conscious act, discourse on translation has tended to be polarized 
between notions of source and target. Definitions of fidelity and 
equivalence have generally focused on the “meaning” of the source 
text and, by extension, on fidelity to the author’s “intention,” based 
on the assumption or premise that every act of writing arises from 
an intention to communicate something.2 In theories of translation 
the implicit focus of this communicative act on behalf of the writer 
has tended to be on its illocutionary force, that is, its intended effect 
on the hearer (or reader).3 On this basis, theories of translation 
have debated the relative importance of the source versus the target 
audience, while writers and poets through the ages have taken 
source texts as springboards for their own creative impulses.4  
A less common focus in translation has been the perlocutionary 
effect, that is, the un-intended effect of an utterance. And while in 
John L. Austin and John R. Searle’s speech act theory perlocution 
can be defined as an indirect speech act, or the effect of the 
speaker’s illocution (an effect that the speaker may or may not have 
intended, in the sense that it may or may not be at cross-purposes 
with what the speaker did intend), I appropriate the term here to 
posit the notion of the literary text as purely a surface expression, 
where the author’s putative intention to signify or represent is a 
subjective inference by the reader on the basis of contextual cues 
(Austin, 1962; Searle, 1975, 59-82). For Deleuze and Guattari, 
attributing Valentin Vološinov’s reflections on the multivariate 
nature of discourse in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language to 
Mikhail Bakhtin, the “primary determination” (la première 
détermination) in language is indirect (Vološinov, 1994 [1929], 26-
37):  
There are many passions within one passion, and all 
kinds of voices within one voice, a whole rumor, 
glossolalia: for this reason every speech act is indirect, 
                                                    
2 This is the basis, for example, of Hans J. Vermeer’s influential 
skopos theory. For a defense of the applicability of this theory in literary 
translation, see Vermeer, 1989, 226–228. Editors’ note: See also 
Collombat, this issue. 
3 I use the term “illocution” as described by John L. Austin and John 
R. Searle (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1975). 
4 For example, Robert Lowell’s Imitations (Lowell, 1961 [1958]). 
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and the act of translation intrinsic to language is the 
indirect speech act. 
Il y a beaucoup de passions dans une passion, et toutes 
sortes de voix dans une voix, toute une rumeur, 
glossolalie: c’est pourquoi tout discours est indirect, et 
que la translation [sic] propre au language est celle du 
discours indirect (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 97).  
Deleuze goes on to stress that metaphor and metonymy are merely 
effects that derive from the indirect speech act. It follows from this 
that, if one is to focus on fidelity or equivalence to the source text, 
the aim should not be the production of a text that conveys some 
underlying meaning or sense in which the signification and 
representation of, for example, metaphor and metonymy are fixed. 
Rather, the aim should be the meticulous rendering of the surface 
expression so that possible effects to be derived—or rather “affects,” 
as I shall argue after Deleuze and Hans-Thies Lehmann—are freed 
anew in the target language and culture: “Le langage est une carte 
non pas un calque” (Language is a map, not a copy) (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1980, 97 -98). The act of translation then becomes not 
one of representation or imitation, but rather a creative, generative, 
or originary act, in the manner that the source text is originary, 
with the aim of rendering its performative capacity in the target 
language. Antoine Berman described the role of translation in 
“refashioning” the “great western languages,” in a sense that echoes 
Deleuze and Guattari’s discussions in Kafka: Pour une littérature 
mineure (Kafka, Toward a Minor Literature) (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1975, 1986 [1975]), where a “major literature” is 
destabilized by the “minor” use of language: 
The analytic of translation, insofar as the analysis of 
properly deforming tendencies bears on the translator, 
does in fact presuppose another figure of translating, 
which must necessarily be called literal translation. Here 
‘literal’ means: attached to the letter (of works). Labor 
on the letter in translation is more originary than 
restitution of meaning. It is through this labor that 
translation, on the one hand, restores the particular 
signifying process of works (which is more than their 
meaning) and, on the other hand, transforms the 
translating language. Translation stimulated the 
fashioning and refashioning of the great western 
languages only because it labored on the letter and 
profoundly modified the translating language. As simple 
restitution of meaning, translation could never have 
played this formative role (Berman, 2000 [1985], 297). 
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For Berman, the “originary” act of translation “restores the 
particular signifying process of works (which is more than their 
meaning).” In the same way, Deleuze and Guattari embrace the role 
of language in literature in its intersubjective communicative 
function, rather than restrict it to a purely informative role (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1980, 101). Further, the perlocutionary aspect of this 
performative capacity is concerned with affect rather than effect. 
This performative, or dramatic, capacity of language in the 
Deleuzean sense invites a parallel with theatre and more 
specifically, with postdramatic theatre. First described by Lehmann 
in 1999 as an avant-garde genre in which the multiplicity of 
performative possibilities of a script are foregrounded, 
postdramatic theatre fosters ephemeral affects and interaction with 
the material environment of the stage and the audience as 
participants, in contrast to a unidirectional, stable and repeatable 
interpretation delivered by performers to a largely passive 
audience. In his seminal treatise, Lehmann underlines the 
emergence of what “might be” in drama in stark contrast to the 
centrality of the logos to traditional Western rhetoric, which 
reached its apotheosis with Hegel and was further imbued with a 
Marxist dialectical perspective on history as drama: 
The complicity of drama and logic, and then drama and 
dialectic, dominates the European ‘Aristotelian’ 
tradition—which turns out to be highly alive even in 
Brecht’s ‘non-Aristotelian drama’ (Lehmann, 2006, 41). 
While Lehmann’s focus is on textual material intended for the 
theatre, the (anti)drama or theatricality of prose is essentially the 
focus of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical treatment of 
literature where, as in postdramatic theatre, plot is subordinated to 
the experiential, fragmented surface tension of the narrative.5  
In this essay I propose to explore how Deleuze and Guattari’s 
perspective of literature can inform a theory of literary translation 
for the postdramatic text that, instead of being concerned with the 
causal chain of “intention” (in the speaker) and “effect” (on the 
hearer), directs its gaze to the literary concepts of “expression” and 
“affect” described in Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure and 
elaborated in Mille plateaux (A Thousand Plateaus) and later in 
Deleuze’s preface to Samuel Beckett’s Quad, “L’Épuisé” (“The 
Exhausted”) and “Bégaya-t-il” (“He Stuttered”) (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1975, 1980; Deleuze, 1992, 1993a). Elements of 
                                                    
5 For an exhaustive and insightful demonstration of Deleuze’s 
treatment of prose as (post)drama, see Ronald Bogue (Bogue, 2003).  
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postdramatic expression will be examined with reference, where 
appropriate, to performative elements in Kafka, Proust, and 
Beckett, as explored by Deleuze and Guattari, but also in relation to 
Gertrude Stein and other works by Beckett, where certain formal 
features invite comparison with postcolonial writers Mohammed 
Dib and Abdelwahab Meddeb. 
 
Anaphora, Punctuation, and Aporia 
Stein, perhaps more than any other modernist poet in the English 
language, pushed to the limit what can be done with surface 
expression, as for example in “Winning His Way, A Narrative Poem 
of Poetry” (1931), first published posthumously in Stanzas in 
Meditation: 
Winning His Way 
     Or her way. 
     It is very often to have it warmer to content her. 
     And they went their way. 
     They were chosen to be won their way. 
     This is the way that it was done. 
 One. 
     But why will they be away when they are at an advantage. To 
stay, and be welcome. 
     Finding it lonesome. 
     They are willing. To be welcome. 
     Finding it handsome. 
     They are willing to be able. 
     To be welcome. 
     A fortnight ago. Or so. They went away. Carefully. In inten-
tion. 
     A man sitting upon a tree and they were singing to me. In 
welcome. 
     He was perfectly aware that he was sitting there. And wel-
come. 
     He knew that. Roses. Are. Red. And. Roses. Are. White. And 
Roses. Are. Rose. Colored. (Stein, 1956, 155)  
Notable surface features of this long poem, in addition to distinctive 
lineation and hyphenation, can be found in Stein’s unusual and 
insistent use of pronouns for which no antecedents are given, other 
than, perhaps, the pronouns themselves as they are repeated: “his,” 
“her,” “it,” “they,” “me,” “he.” And apart from the vague and 
slippery vocable “way,” it is not until the fifteenth line that Stein 
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uses a noun with specific denotational value (“a man”), albeit with 
an indefinite article. A further surface feature of Stein’s poem is the 
insistent use of the full stop, the truncated phrases propelling the 
narrative ever forward in spite of this, or rather, because their 
unfinished form and incomplete content demand it. Stein favored 
this form of punctuation above all others: “Periods have a life of 
their own a necessity of their own a feeling of their own a time of 
their own” (Stein, 1988 [1935], 218).6  
Indeterminacy, repetition, and the full stop also play a defining 
role in the linear progression of “Worstward Ho,” and it could be 
argued that Beckett’s deictic fugue (“Him,” “One,” “It”) echoes 
Stein’s style:7  
Whose-words? Ask in vain. Or not in vain if say no 
knowing. No saying. No words for him whose words. 
Him? One. No words for one whose words. One? It. No 
words for it whose words. Better worse so. (Beckett, 
1989, 109-110)  
A striking correspondence in form can also be seen in Dib’s use of 
the full stop, coupled with the indeterminacy of pronouns and 
adverbs, in his poem “La guerre” (War) from the 1998 collection 
L’Enfant-jazz (Jazz-Child). By way of illustration, let us review 
canto 4: 
Il se tenait là. 
Derrière les vitres. 
Immobile, sans bruit. 
Il demeurait là. 
Dehors. Quelqu'un. 
Derrière la fenêtre. 
Quelqu’un regardait. 
La lumière éclairait 
La guerre immobile. (Dib, 2007 [1998], 368) 
                                                    
6 “Winning His Way” was not available in French until 2005. 
However, a French translation of Lectures en Amérique by Claude Grimal 
(Éditions Christian Bourgois), which did contain Stein’s essays on 
punctuation and on poetry, was made available in 1978. 
7 “Worstward Ho” was not translated into French by Beckett as he 
considered it to be untranslatable, although it was eventually translated 
by Edith Fournier and published to critical acclaim as a book entitled Cap 
au pire in 1991.  
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He stood there. 
Behind the glass. 
Stock still, quiet. 
He remained there. 
Outside. Someone. 
Behind the window. 
Someone stared. 
The light revealed  
A war, stock still. 
The anaphoric referent in canto 4 at first appears straightforward, 
but is soon put in doubt; the third person “il” (he) in the first stanza 
suggests that someone (the poem’s eponymous Jazz-Child, 
perhaps) is standing at the window, looking out. On the same, or 
the other, side of the glass/window pane, the same or another “he,” 
a threatening presence, perhaps a soldier or guerrilla fighter, is 
standing “là” (there). The “someone” in the final tercet may or may 
not be the one (or two) mentioned in the previous tercets. Thus 
there is no categorical indication as to whether there are one, two, 
or three entities in this canto. 
While full stops signify, they have no culturally specific 
connotation, at least none that can be evoked purely by their 
grammatical function. Stein’s controversial sympathies (she 
translated, but didn’t publish, many of Maréchal Pétain’s speeches) 
were recently expounded again by Barbara Will (Will, 2011). Her 
reported wartime “collaboration,” however, has been vigorously 
contested and a balanced and nuanced account of Stein’s 
“confusing and contradictory” politics can be found in Charles 
Bernstein’s “dossier” (Bernstein, 2017, n.p). In Dib’s “La guerre,” 
the insistent use of full stops may become conflated for some 
readers, by association with Stein, with the Vichy regime and its 
legacy of continuing repression in North Africa. A contemporary 
reading, recalling the opening lines of Stein’s “Winning His Way,” 
highlights the pernicious nature of war in the poem’s shifting 
assignations of “the other” or indefinite “they.” The full stop then 
becomes a point de repère, and in addition to its intimation of 
finality as a poetic device, traces an implacable, static grid, the 
invisible iron grip of a Deleuzean war machine.  
Dib’s punctuation, coupled with the indeterminacy of the 
pronouns and the shifting referential nature of the nouns, serves to 
create a menacing, allegorical prison, through which only words can 
escape by refusing a role of static or finite representation. Signifier 
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and signified move laterally and vertically, in a manner reminiscent 
of critic Martin Richet’s observation when reviewing the French 
translation of Stein’s Stanzas in Meditation: “Ils [les noms et 
pronoms] forment un paysage verbal en mouvement qui inclut ou 
incorpore le monde mais ne le représentent pas” (They [the nouns 
and pronouns] create a changing verbal landscape which includes 
and incorporates the world but [they] do not represent it) (Richet, 
2006, n.p.). Similarly, the shifting referential use of nouns and 
pronouns in Dib’s long poem “La guerre,” together with the lack of 
spatio-temporal (and hence, historiographic) referents other than 
the passage of time, prevents anchorage in specific geopolitical 
events and raises his poetics to an aesthetic level that, rather like 
Kafka’s texts, functions like “a pure machine,” which, as Deleuze 
pointed out, is an “épure” (a scale drawing or blueprint) when 
stripped of “material socio-political assemblages” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1975, 70).  
The comma can also be deployed to trump the reader’s 
expectation. In Abdelwahab Meddeb’s Le tombeau d’Ibn Arabi, the 
comma does not follow grammatical conventions but adopts a 
disjunctive function to constitute a key formal feature of his 
aporetic discourse (Meddeb, 1995). In his afterword to the English 
translation, Jean-Luc Nancy draws attention to this rhetorical 
device, which in Meddeb’s prose poem might have played the role 
of the line ending, noting the counterintuitive placement of “these 
little wings, these tiny paws or claws that at first you don’t notice, 
accustomed as you are to their presence in language” (Nancy, 2010, 
114). When the comma is used to separate, for example, the 
prepositional phrase “de…” from the noun it modifies, Meddeb 
heightens the indeterminacy of this morpheme, which can indicate 
possession or provenance, but also substance, time, means, or 
purpose. Meddeb’s translator, Charlotte Mandell, notes how “‘de 
ses yeux noirs’ could be translated either as ‘of her black eyes’ or 
‘from her black eyes’” (Mandell, 2010, in Nancy, 2010, 115). Nancy 
hints at the multiple values that could be ascribed to this phrase in 
his closing remarks to the afterword: 
Thus: I enter into the black, of her black eyes. 
Do you read this as “I enter into the black of her black 
eyes”? Or “Starting from her black eyes I enter into the 
black”? 
You don’t know (…) (Nancy, 2010, 115) 
How is the translator, then, to convey this unrealized modifier, 
when she does not know the author’s “intention,” other than by 
preserving the comma’s ambiguous role while being forced to 
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choose just one syntactical equivalent for the multiple values of 
“de”? It is felicitous that the preposition “of” carries many 
comparable, if not identical, values in English, and thus succeeds in 
carrying to some extent the indeterminacy of the surface expression 
in the target language.  
 
(Dis)organizing the Constituents of Expression 
In their discourse on Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari further unpack or 
unfold constituents from within the literary expression, for 
example, its intersemiotic dimension in the portrait of the porter 
with the bent head, or at the next level, the pure sound of the belfry 
or tower in Kafka’s The Castle (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 52). 
More specifically, in the chapter “Les composantes de l’expression” 
(The [Kafka’s] constituents of expression), instead of a simple 
binary opposition between content and expression, Deleuze and 
Guattari elaborate a conception of the latter that, far from creating 
anthropomorphic metaphor, actively unravels content:8  
We do not find ourselves before a structural 
correspondence between two kinds of form, forms of 
content and forms of expression, but rather before an 
expression machine, capable of disorganizing its own 
forms, and of disorganizing forms of content, in order to 
liberate pure contents which will merge with expressions 
into one and the same intense element. 
Nous ne nous trouvons donc pas devant une 
correspondance structurale entre deux sortes de formes, 
formes de contenu et formes d’expression, mais devant 
une machine d’expression, capable de désorganiser ses 
propres formes, et de désorganiser les formes de 
contenus, pour libérer de purs contenus qui se 
confondront avec les expressions dans une même 
matière intense (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 51). 
On the premise of this Deleuzean conception of literature, it is 
arguably the enabling of this “expression machine” that should 
constitute the focus of the translator’s task, both in her appraisal of 
the source and in rendering the target. This entails, when 
considering the source, starting with the surface expression and not 
the content or “intended meaning,” and when rendering the target, 
translating the formal relations that actively unravel content. These 
                                                    
8 In this chapter, Deleuze and Guattari identify these constituents as 
the epistolary letter, the novella, and the novel. 
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relations are expressed through syntactic and semantic cues, but 
they operate on a separate plane from the source or target 
language’s grammar and lexicon. Their role in the novella is to 
furnish the coordinates for a “carte d’intensités” (a map of 
intensities) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 65): 
[The novella] is a creative line of flight that wants to say 
nothing other than itself. Unlike [Kafka’s epistolary] 
letters, becoming-animal allows nothing to subsist of the 
duality between a subject of the utterance and a subject 
of the uttered, but constitutes one and the same trial, 
one and the same process, which replaces subjectivity. 9 
[La nouvelle] est une ligne de fuite créatrice qui ne veut 
rien dire d’autre qu’elle-même. À la différence des 
lettres, le devenir-animal ne laisse rien subsister de la 
dualité d’un sujet d’énonciation et d’un sujet d’énoncé, 
mais constitue un seul et même procès, un seul et même 
processus qui remplace la subjectivité (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1975, 63).  
Thus in the novella the expression is the content, is “nothing other 
than itself,” and replaces subjectivity with a process of becoming 
that defies the necessarily static, because referential, role of a 
translation focused on “content” per se: “Car l’expression précède le 
contenu et l’entraîne (à condition bien sûr de ne pas être 
signifiante)” (For expression precedes content and entrains it [on 
condition of course that it does not signify]) (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1975, 74). In the act or gesture of translating an expression, the 
translator becomes the transient and temporal subject of the 
utterance—and the subject of the uttered, where these have become 
indistinguishable, as in Deleuze’s description of expression in 
Kafka’s novellas.  
The novel, which is the third component of Kafka’s expression 
machine, is a more complex assemblage, which allows an exit-path 
for the novella but can only develop “si les indices machiniques 
                                                    
9 Brian Massumi, who translated Mille plateaux into English, notes 
that Deleuze and Guattari’s “procès” carries the double sense of 
“trial”―which brings to mind Kafka’s Le procès (The Trial)―and 
“process” as a ‘way of proceeding’ (Massumi, 2008 [1987], xvii). “Trial”, 
however, can also carry the sense of ‘test’ or ‘proof’, as in the title of 
Antoine Berman’s study of translation in the German Romantics 
“L’Épreuve de l’étranger,” and I have opted here to interpret this sliding 
double-entendre from “procès” to “processus” explicitly in English, in a 
slight shift from Deleuze and Guattari’s more subtle (and hence more 
open-ended) semantic fugue (Berman, 1984). 
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s’organisent en un véritable agencement consistant par lui-même” 
(if the machinic indices organize themselves into a truly self-
grounded assemblage) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 70). And yet, 
paradoxically, such a text cannot develop without latching onto the 
material world, and thus, either it reverts to the dead-end of the 
novella or it becomes “interminable”: 
[…] the text that consists of an explicit machine cannot, 
however, develop unless it can latch on to such material 
socio-political assemblages (because a pure machine is 
merely a [blank] schema which shapes neither novella 
nor novel). ―Kafka, therefore, has multiple reasons for 
abandoning a text, either because it is cut short, or 
because it is interminable: but Kafka’s criteria are 
entirely new, and accountable only to himself, with 
channels from one text genre to another, refashionings, 
exchanges, etc., so as to constitute a rhizome, a burrow, 
a map of transformations. Every one of its failures is a 
masterpiece, a shoot within the rhizome.  
[…] un texte qui comporte une machine explicite ne se 
développe pourtant pas s’il n’arrive à se brancher sur de 
tels agencements concrets sociaux-politiques (car une 
pure machine n’est qu’une épure, qui ne forme ni une 
nouvelle ni un roman). ―Kafka a donc de multiples 
raisons d’abandonner un texte, soit parce qu’il tourne 
court, soit parce qu’il est interminable : mais les critères 
de Kafka sont entièrement nouveaux, et ne valent que 
pour lui, avec des communications d’un genre de texte à 
l’autre, des réinvestissements, des échanges, etc., de 
manière à constituer un rhizome, un terrier, une carte de 
transformations. Chaque échec y est un chef-d’œuvre, 
une tige dans le rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 
70). 
The constituents of expression in Kafka, and by extension any 
minor literature, accordingly, form a rhizome, a complex of 
multiple shoots driven by intensities in perpetual flux: 
Everywhere one and the same passion for writing; but 
not the same one. Writing crosses a threshold on each 
occasion, and there is no superior or inferior threshold. 
These are thresholds of intensities, intensities that are 
higher or lower only in the sense of the direction in 
which one travels them. 
Partout une seule et même passion d’écrire ; mais pas la 
même. Chaque fois l’écriture franchit un seuil, et il n’y a 
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pas de seuil supérieur ou inférieur. Ce sont des seuils 
d’intensités, qui ne sont plus hautes ou plus basses que 
suivant le sens où on les parcourt (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1975, 74).10  
In his essay “Spinoza et les trois ‘éthiques” (“Spinoza and the Three 
‘Ethics’”), Deleuze distinguishes “scalar” affects (which he names 
“affections” for the sake of distinction) from “vectorial” affects. The 
latter, though derived from the former, are not reducible to them: 
These are passages, becomings, rises and falls, 
continuous variations in potential, which pass from one 
state to another; we shall call them affects, which is 
more appropriate, and no longer affections. They are 
signs of waxing and waning, vectorial signs (of the kind 
joy-sorrow), and no longer scalar, like affections, 
sensations, or perceptions.  
Ce sont des passages, des devenirs, des montées et des 
chutes, des variations continues de puissance11, qui vont 
d’un état à un autre : on les appellera affects, à 
proprement parler, et non plus affections. Ce sont des 
signes de croissance et de décroissance, des signes 
vectoriels (du type joie-tristesse), et non plus scalaires 
comme les affections, sensations ou perceptions 
(Deleuze, 1993b, 173; Deleuze’s emphasis). 
These affects are “signs” that reflect or absorb each other: states, 
shadows on the surface, an interplay between two bodies, always on 
the edge, aporetic, “effects of light” (les effets de lumière) that are 
“relative” in space and time (Deleuze, 1993b, 184). Yet, on one 
reading of Spinoza, encapsulated by Deleuze for the sake of his 
argument: 
Signs or affects are inadequate ideas and passions; 
common notions or concepts are adequate ideas, from 
which derive true actions. […] It is a material, affective 
                                                    
10 Inexplicably, the final sentence of this passage, as translated by 
Dana Polan, reads: “These are thresholds of intensities that are not higher 
or lower than the sound that runs through them” (Deleuze, 1986 [1975], 
41; my emphasis).  
11 The term “puissance” here is not related to Foucault’s concept of 
power for which, according to Massumi, Deleuze uses the term “pouvoir” 
(Massumi, 2008 [1987], xvii), but rather to the latent energy or intensity 
potential which must be inferred from the analogies Deleuze uses here to 
describe “affect.” 
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language rather than a form of expression, and which 
resembles the cries rather than the discourse of concept. 
Les signes ou affects sont des idées inadéquates et des 
passions ; les notions communes ou concepts sont des 
idées adéquates d’où découlent de véritables actions. […] 
C’est un langage matériel affectif plutôt qu’une forme 
d’expression, et qui ressemble plutôt aux cris qu’au 
discours du concept (Deleuze, 1993b, 179). 
While Spinoza ostensibly demonstrates that affects detract from 
understanding the world through concepts, Deleuze argues that 
Spinoza persistently undermines his own reasoning in the twists, 
turns, and asides of his scholia, which favor the fundamental role of 
affects in their specificity (Deleuze, 1993b, 183). It is the surface 
expression of these affects, or style, that Deleuze’s “great” writers 
deliver in and through the stuttering minor language of Kafka or 
Beckett, as discussed by Deleuze in his essay “Bégaya-t-il” 
(Deleuze, 1993a).  
A further analogy with the theatre will perhaps help to challenge 
the traditional perspective of the translator in this respect, where 
the act of translation and the act of performance bear comparable 
responsibilities in relation to the author’s expression. Anthony 
Uhlmann, in his Deleuzean analysis of dramatic emotion in Beckett, 
Kafka, and Heinrich Von Kleist, laments the frequently corrupted 
relationship between expression and affect that may be introduced 
on stage by the Stanislavski system of method acting (Uhlmann, 
2009). Just as in theatre, according to Uhlmann, the actor’s 
“familiar, easily recognizable emotion” interferes with the affect of 
the play, so the translator’s canned formulas, the commonplaces 
(topoi) generated in conformance to a standard rhetorical norm in 
the target language, constitute an act of representing, or standing 
for, the source text, which interposes an interpretation of meaning 
drawn from the translator’s preformed conception of a target 
culture (Uhlmann, 2009, 61). While introducing a shift toward a 
putative audience in the target language, the translator is in danger 
of fixing, in the sense of immobilizing, the text’s generative, 
creative, or originary capacity inherent in its surface schema, 
whereby all other possible affects are negated. 
 
Qui?, Combien?, Comment?, Où?, Quand? 
To focus on the source text’s generative capacity is to see it as a 
Deleuzean “map” or generic blueprint that will allow infinite 
repetition and variation along multiple axes of language and 
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culture. As Christophe Collard remarked in a comparison with 
adaptation for the theatre, the focus of translation is on what unites 
rather than divides the source and the target (Collard, 2011, 20). 
However, each new instantiation of the source text’s spatio-
temporal dynamic can only be effective so long as the relationship 
between the variables that determine it is preserved; if the text is a 
diagram, its instantiation will not “work” if the coordinates are 
flawed in their transposition.  
It is useful here to think of the text in terms of its fundamental 
variables, as in the argument put forward by Deleuze in 1967 to 
members of the Société française de philosophie, two years before 
submitting his thesis Différence et Répétition in a paper published 
under the title “La méthode de dramatization” (“The Method of 
Dramatisation”): 
It is not certain that the question what is [this]? is a 
good question for the purpose of discovering the essence 
or the Idea. It is possible that questions like who?, how 
many?, how?, where?, when? may be better―both to 
discover the essence and to discover something more 
important concerning the Idea.  
Il n’est pas sûr que la question qu’est ce que ? soit une 
bonne question pour découvrir l’essence où l’Idée. Il se 
peut que des questions du type qui ?, combien ?, 
comment?, où?, quand?, soient meilleures―tant pour 
découvrir l’essence que pour déterminer quelque chose 
de plus important concernant l’Idée (Deleuze, 2002 
[1967], 131; Deleuze’s emphasis). 
For Deleuze, the literary text is a machine for the expression of the 
“Idea,” and this Idea is both immanent in and distinct from the 
concepts expressed. It is equally external to its author or reader 
(performer, actor, or translator), who can merely come into contact 
with it, as a straight line does with a curve, through a series of 
singularities, or instantiations mediated through its utterance, 
whether voiced or silent. This Idea can equally be expressed in 
translation or performance, the latter being a form of translation, 
and the affect this creates is what Deleuze terms the “virtual,” after 
Henri Bergson and Raymond Ruyer. Deleuze draws on Marcel 
Proust to illustrate his premise: 
The virtual is opposed to the actual and, in this capacity, 
constitutes an entire reality. We have seen that this 
reality of the virtual is composed of differential relations 
and the distribution of singularities. In every respect the 
virtual corresponds to the formula Proust used to define 
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his experiential states: “real without being actual, ideal 
without being abstract.”  
Virtuel s’oppose à actuel, et, à ce titre, possède une 
pleine réalité. Nous avons vu que cette réalité du virtuel 
est constituée par les rapports différentiels et les 
distributions de singularités. A tous égards le virtuel 
répond à la formule par laquelle Proust définissait ses 
états d’expérience : « réels sans être actuels, idéaux sans 
être abstraits » (Proust, 1989, 451, in Deleuze, 2002 
[1967], 141). 
Deleuze explains that “differential relations” are determined only in 
relation to each other, by their reciprocal relationship, in the 
manner of phonemes, or atomic particles, or genes (Deleuze, 2002 
[1967], 139). In terms of literature, we may consider differential 
relations the formal relations that determine the disjunctive 
syntactic and semantic operations of the postdramatic text. Deleuze 
describes “singularities” as “événements idéaux” (ideating/ideated 
events), which correspond with differential relations and are a 
series of “ordinary points” (points ordinaires) engendered by a 
“remarkable point” (point remarquable) (Deleuze, 2002 [1967], 
139).  
Each remarkable point can be conceived as the “utterance” (la 
parole), which, as we have seen, Deleuze likens to the point of 
intersection of a straight line with a curve, which engenders a series 
of ordinary points (in language) to constitute a (textually mediated) 
event. Deleuze argues that ontological and epistemological “sense” 
(le sens) arises from the distribution of these points in the “Idea” 
(Deleuze, 2002 [1967], 139). He insists on the necessity for the 
complete interdependence of differential relations and singularities 
as follows: 
The Idea emerges, therefore, as a multiplicity, which 
must be travelled in two ways, in terms of variation in 
the differential relations, and in terms of the distribution 
of singularities that corresponds to specific values in 
these relations. What we previously coined vice-diction 
merges with this double trajectory or this double 
determination, reciprocal and complete [in itself]. 
L’Idée apparaît donc comme une multiplicité qui doit 
être parcourue en deux sens, du point de vue de la 
variation des rapports différentiels, et du point de vue de 
la répartition des singularités qui correspond à certaines 
valeurs de ces rapports. Ce que nous appelions 
précédemment procédé de la vice-diction se confond 
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avec ce double parcours ou cette double determination, 
réciproque et complète (Deleuze, 2002 [1967], 139; 
Deleuze’s emphasis).12 
This reciprocity between differential relations and singularities in 
the expression of the Idea provides a model for conceptualizing a 
dynamic approach to literary translation whereby a unit of 
translation can be seen as a “singularity that corresponds to specific 
values in these relations” (Deleuze, 2002 [1967], 139).  
The specific values in a text are what determine its tone, style, 
register, and ultimately, the expression and its affect. By way of 
illustration, let us consider Deleuze’s “who?, how many?, how?, 
where?, when? …” as specific values determined in textual form, 
and whether/how the singularities to which they give rise can be 
generated without significantly altering their differential relations 
in the target language.  
The practice of representing language relations through 
transformation operations is well established, notably through the 
principles of Noam Chomsky’s generative grammar.13 Another 
means to represent language has been through predicate logic; 
issuing from philosophical principles, the predicating function that 
answers the question “Qu’est-ce que?” is a fundamental building 
block of deductive reasoning. The reasoning mechanism is linear 
and bidirectional; the logical sequence “If a then c, a = b, therefore, 
if b then c,” can be reversed, but only if it follows the same path in 
the opposite direction. Theories of formal-equivalence translation 
have tended toward a literal rendering of form, and in particular of 
                                                    
12 “We shall name this process vice-diction, which is entirely different 
from that of contradiction. It consists in proceeding through the Idea as a 
multiplicity. The question no longer relates to knowing whether the Idea 
is one or multiple, or even both at the same time; “multiplicity,” employed 
as a noun, designates a domain where the Idea, in itself, is much closer to 
an accident than to an abstracted essence, and may only be determined 
with the questions who? how? how many? where and when? in what 
case?—all forms that plot the true spatio-temporal coordinates” (Nous 
devons appeler vice-diction ce procédé tout à fait différent de celui de la 
contradiction. Il consiste à parcourir l’Idée comme une multiplicité. La 
question n’est plus de savoir si l’Idée est une ou multiple, ou même les 
deux à la fois ; « multiplicité », employé comme substantif, désigne un 
domaine où l’Idée, par elle-même, est beaucoup plus proche de l’accident 
que de l’essence abstraite, et ne peut être déterminée qu’avec les question 
qui ? comment ? combien ? où et quand ? dans quel cas ?—toutes formes 
qui tracent les véritable coordonnées spatio-temporelles) (Deleuze, 2002 
[1967], 133–134).  
13 For a retrospective overview, see Chomsky, 1986. 
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syntax and morphology.14 Maria Tymocszko, for example, posited 
one argument in favor of formal equivalence on the grounds that a 
representation based on formal logical expressions of the type “(Эx) 
(y,z)”—in other words, there exists an x where the variable x is the 
subject and y, z are variables that predicate the subject—could be 
employed to retain “objectivity” in the translator (Tymocszko, 
1985).  
Limiting the representation of language’s form to the sole 
function of predication, however, is insufficient to address the 
entire range of differential relations inherent in an expression. 
Moreover, generative and transformational grammars, while 
allowing more functional breadth than formal logic for the syntactic 
expression of “who, how many, how, where, when, …” are 
unidirectional within the scope of a sentence, and become more 
constraining as the sentence progresses. Such grammars do not 
cater well to abrupt changes in sense, juxtaposition, or the 
disjunctive syntax that is a prime characteristic of the “Idea” in 
Deleuze’s “minor literature” (Deleuze, 1993a, 138-139).15 Further, 
by definition these models take no account of the pragmatic 
dimensions of the speech act; while they have proven adequate for 
structuralist notions of language, they cannot fully express non-
standard or creative uses of language of the kind described in the 
works of modernist or postcolonial writers such as Stein and 
Beckett, Dib and Meddeb. 
 
Stuttering the Language 
Translation theories that implicitly rely on a generative or logical 
model of language fall short, for example, when indeterminacy is a 
focal trope in literary discourse, as in Beckett’s deictic fugue 
(“Him,” “One,” “It”) in “Worstward Ho” (Beckett, 1989, 109-110). 
Leaving aside the difficulties of rendering Beckett’s sound sense, a 
more appropriate model would involve the determination of 
coordinates in a manner akin to the mathematical concept of the 
vector, where variables can define both position and direction along 
                                                    
14 In contrast, dynamic-equivalence theory, as first put forward by 
Eugene Nida, has been more concerned with faithfulness to content 
(Nida, 1964).  
15 Barbara Godard identifies Deleuze’s “disjunctive synthesis” as a key 
determiner for the notion of translation as “paradoxical coordination”: 
“Working by combination and contiguity, the logic of the AND... AND... 
AND..., of the disjunctive synthesis produces proliferation and dispersal 
as a non-exclusive conjunction” (Godard, 2000, 62). 
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multiple axes, thereby encoding the potential expression or 
unfolding of multiple positions and discontinuities in perspective 
among the differential relations of expression and affect.  
Further, the way in which the language of a (minor) literature 
(“la langue”), as opposed to speech or utterance in the linguistic 
sense (for which he uses the term “la parole”) come together is 
fundamental to an approach to translating surface expression with 
the aim of enabling affect: 
To make the language stutter: is this possible without 
confusing it with the utterance? […] If language is 
confused with utterance, it is only with a very special 
utterance, a poetic utterance that deploys the full power 
of bifurcation and variation, of heterogenesis and 
modulation intrinsic to language. For example, the 
linguist [Gustave] Guillaume considers each unit of 
language, not as a constant in relation to others, but as a 
series of differential positions or vantage points taken 
from an assignable dynamism: the indefinite article “a” 
will travel the entire zone of variation comprising a 
movement toward particularization, and the definite 
article “the”, the entire zone comprising a movement 
toward generalization. It is a stutter, where each position 
of “a” or of “the” constitutes a vibration. The language 
trembles through all its limbs. Therein lies the basis of a 
poetic understanding of language itself: it is as if 
language extended an abstract line, infinitely varied. 
Faire bégayer la langue : est-ce possible sans la 
confondre avec la parole? […] Si la langue se confond 
avec la parole, c’est seulement avec une parole très 
spéciale, parole poétique qui effectue toute la puissance 
de bifurcation et de variation, d’hétérogenèse et de 
modulation propre à la langue. Par exemple, le linguiste 
Guillaume considère chaque terme de la langue, non pas 
comme une constante en rapport avec d’autres, mais 
comme une série de positions différentielles ou points de 
vue pris sur un dynamisme assignable : l’article indéfini 
« un » parcourra toute la zone de variation comprise 
dans un mouvement de particularisation, et l’article 
défini « le », toute la zone comprise dans un mouvement 
de généralisation. C’est un bégaiement, chaque position 
de « un » ou de « le » constituant une vibration. La 
langue tremble de tous ses membres. Il y a là le principe 
d’une compréhension poétique de la langue elle-même : 
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c’est comme si la langue tendait une ligne abstraite 
infiniment variée (Deleuze, 1993a, 136-137).16  
The sense of language Deleuze derives from Gustave Guillaume in 
this explication is the sense in which the translator, if she is to be 
true to the “stutter” in the literary expression, is to approach 
language. Deleuze stresses that this “stutter” is not a question of bi- 
or multilingualism. Rather, it is a “minorization” of the major 
language, a grammar of disequilibrium, a disjunctive syntax acting 
upon the major language (Deleuze, 1993a, 141).  
Claire Colebrook explains the jump from early twentieth-
century phenomenologist Husserl’s logic-based universal to 
Deleuze’s (vectorial) perspective thus: 
[But] whereas Husserl saw sense as a predicate―judging 
the world to be thus―Deleuze sees sense as the verb, 
releasing from this world of effected relations―this 
territory, assemblage or mixture―the potential for other 
relations, other worlds. In addition to the surface of 
production, or the space that is produced from the 
encounters of singular powers, there is also the 
metaphysical surface, which is the image of those 
powers not as they are actualized but as they might be 
(Colebrook, 2005, 191-192; Colebrook’s emphasis).  
It is this focus on what “might be” in language that invites a parallel 
with the theatre, more specifically with the postdramatic genre, and 
entrains a rhetoric of translation that reflects the aporia of the 
source expression in stark contrast to the centrality of the logos to 
traditional Western rhetoric. While ultimately unattainable, an 
approach to text as map, with a focus on the surface relations, 
without aesthetic or historicist interpretation of content, would 
seem an appropriate means for the translator of non-Hegelian 
postdramatic texts to remain true to the “intentio of the original” 
(Benjamin, 2000 [1923], 21). This Deleuzean perspective offers new 
insights into how Walter Benjamin’s “intentio,” in the sense of the 
(vectorial) tension of the text, as opposed to the writer or 
translator’s intention (and attendant distortion or interference by 
subjective affections), can be enacted in the target language. 
 
                                                    
16 Deleuze refers the reader to Gustave Guillaume’s theory of the 
“psychomechanics” of language in Langage et science du langage 
(Guillaume, 1964).  
 Madeleine Campbell 20 Poroi 13,1 (May 2017) 
Translation as Gestus 
Translation, like writing, arises from a ritual. The translator, the 
performer, must be exact to the utterance and the uttered, to the 
“who?, how many?, how?, where?, when?” in order to, as does 
Beckett, “[s]ay for be said. Missaid. From now say for missaid.” 
(Deleuze, 2002 [1967], 131; Beckett, 1989, 101). The semiotic craft 
may vary depending on the mode of expression, but the object is the 
same: to allow the differential relations, irrespective of mode, to 
generate a precise simulacrum, to perform a “ritornello” in order, 
as Deleuze describes the language of Beckett’s Quad, to “exhaust” 
(épuiser) the possible: 
Just as the image appears as a visual or aural ritornello 
to the one who makes it, space appears as a motor 
ritornello―postures, positions, and gaits―to the one 
who travels through it (Deleuze, 1997 [1993], 160).17 
De même que l’image apparaît à celui qui la fait comme 
une ritournelle visuelle ou sonore, l’espace apparaît à 
celui qui le parcourt comme une ritournelle motrice, 
postures, positions et démarches (Deleuze, 1992, 75). 
In this sense the translator/performer’s ritual is analogous to that 
of the writer of the source text (the one “who makes it”), with the 
exception, perhaps, that the gestus of the translator/performer (the 
one who “travels through it”) would, to quote Laura Cull and 
Matthew Ghoulish in relation to performance, “not have existed 
without the work [she is] responding to” (Cull and Ghoulish, 2009, 
144).18 Even this, however, is on a continuum, as the same could be 
said of a writer. The difference between writing and translation is 
primarily determined by chronology; both are transient 
translations of the (a)temporal into space.  
Copyright © 2017 Madeleine Campbell 
                                                    
17 I have nothing to add to this simple and effective translation by 
Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco.  
18 According to Cull and Ghoulish, for the experimental Goat Island 
collaborative performance group, created in 1987, “a creative response 
does not imitate or represent an ‘original,’ nor does it seek to critique it. 
Rather, Goat Island advise us to ‘think of a creative response as your own 
work that would not have existed without the work you are responding 
to’” (Cull and Ghoulish, 2009, 144).  
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l’Université Laval, 1964. 
Hallward, P. Absolutely Postcolonial. Manchester, UK: Manchester 
University Press, 2001. 
Kafka, F. “Le château.” In Kafka, F., C. David (Eds.) and A. Vialatte 
(Trans.) Œuvres complètes I. (Pp. 1119-1334). Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989 [1938]. 
Lehmann, H.-T. Postdramatic Theatre. Jürs-Munby, K. (Trans.). 
Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006 [1999].  
Lowell. R. Imitations. London: Faber and Faber, 1961 [1958].  
Massumi, B. “Notes on Translation and Acknowledgments.” In 
Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari, B. Massumi (Trans.) A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. (Pp. xvi-xix). 
London: Continuum, 2008 [1987]. 
 Madeleine Campbell 23 Poroi 13,1 (May 2017) 
Meddeb, A. Le tombeau d‘Ibn Arabi. Cognac, FR: Fata Morgana, 
1995. 
Nancy, J.-L. “Afterword: Three Questions about Tombeau of Ibn 
Arabi.” In Meddeb, A. and C. Mandell (Trans.) Tombeau of 
Ibn Arabi and White Traverses. (Pp. 109-115). New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2010. 
Nida, E. A. Toward a Science of Translating. Leiden, NL: EJ. Brill, 
1964. 
Proust, M. “Le temps retrouvé.” In Proust, M. À la recherche du 
temps perdu. Vol IV. Paris: Gallimard, 1989.  
Richet, M. “Strophes en méditation de Gertrude Stein par Martin 
Richet.” Les Parutions de Sitaudis 7 (2006): 
http://www.sitaudis.fr/Parutions/strophes-en-meditation-
de-gertrude-stein.php.  
Searle, J. R. “Indirect Speech Acts.” In Morgan, P. and J. L. Cole 
(Eds.) Syntax and Semantics, 3: Speech Acts. (Pp. 59-82). 
New York: Academic Press, 1975. 
Stein, G. Stanzas in Meditation and Other Poems 1929-1933. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1956. 
———. “Poetry and Grammar.” In Stein, G. Lectures in America. 
(Pp. 209-246). London: Virago Press, 1988 [1935]. 
Tymoczko, M. “How Distinct are Formal and Dynamic 
Equivalence?” In Hermans, T. (Ed.) The Manipulation of 
Literature. (Pp. 63-86). Worcester, UK: Croom Helm, 1985. 
Uhlmann, A. “Expression and Affect in Kleist, Beckett and 
Deleuze.” In Cull, L. (Ed.) Deleuze and Performance. (Pp. 54-
70). Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2009 
Vermeer, H. J. “Skopos and Commission in Translational Action.” 
In Venuti, L. (Ed.) and A. Chesterman (Trans.) The 
Translation Studies Reader. (Pp. 222-232). London: 
Routledge, 2000 [1989]. 
Vološinov, V. N. “Marxism and the Philosophy of Language.” In 
Morris, P. (Ed.), L. Matejka and I. R. Titunik (Trans.) The 
Bakhtin Reader. (Pp. 26-37). London: Edward Arnold, 1994 
[1929]. 
Will, B. Unlikely Collaboration: Gertrude Stein, Bernard Faÿ, and 
the Vichy Dilemma. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2011. https://doi.org/10.7312/will15262 
 
